
Natural Exceptions to Green Sovereignty? American Environmentalism and the “Immigration Problem”*

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John Hultgren¹

Abstract

Rather than making any general claims supporting or opposing the “greening” of sovereignty, this article examines the variable discourses through which the *ethos of ecosovereignty* is reconfigured. The questions that drive this inquiry are (1) through what discursive pathways do conceptions of nature, political community, and governance intersect to constitute exclusionary ethos of eco-sovereignty? and (2) how might alternative articulations challenge such exclusions? These questions are pursued by examining the contemporary American “environmental restrictionist” (immigration-reduction environmentalist) movement, and critical responses to the movement. It traces how nature, political community, and governance are conceptualized and related to one another in efforts to bolster alternative configurations of ecosovereignty. By gaining insight into the various discourses through which iterations of ecosovereignty emerge, scholars and practitioners might better respond to the multiplicity of ways that nature becomes enmeshed in exclusionary social forms.

Keywords

sovereignty, nature, nationalism, environmentalism, immigration

Introduction

Contemporary green attitudes toward the “sovereign nation-state” are always cautious, often ambivalent, and, sometimes, contradictory.¹ This conceptual haziness is indicative of the complexities, and perhaps inconsistencies, that characterize relations between the normative visions, ontological commitments, and practical politics of popular environmental imaginaries. While it has become commonplace to disavow sovereignty in the name of a liberating, postsovereign future (generally premised upon an ambiguous bioregional, global, or “glocal” arrangement), few

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¹ Department of Politics & International Affairs, Northern Arizona University, Arizona, USA

Corresponding Author:

John Hultgren, Department of Politics & International Affairs, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ 86011, USA
Email: john.hultgren@nau.edu

accounts go so far as to trace the contours of how this might occur and what role any sort of sovereign authority would play in this process.

Among critical environmental commentators who do take a definitive position, a split has emerged. On one side are those who argue that re-embedding sovereignty within a “green state” will produce an authoritative and legitimate “gatekeeper” whose steering capacity can forge a radical ecological democracy.² On the other side are those who view any instantiation of sovereignty as an exclusionary, depoliticizing death knell for the emancipatory potential of environmental thought.³

This debate is instructive as it speaks directly to radical environmentalist strategies and provides an opportunity to explore how “ecocentrists” theorize the interconnections between the constitutive elements of any green sovereignty—namely, nature, political community, and governance.⁴ This article argues that an overarching commonality on both sides of the debate is the failure to consider how the contingent articulations between these constitutive elements serve to reshape what William Connolly has termed the *ethos of sovereignty*.⁵ That is, a particular constellation of communal imaginaries, juridical ideals, and constructions of nature, changes how “the ecosovereign” will value, distribute, and ultimately govern the lives of human and nonhuman Others. Analytic focus on the ethos of sovereignty shifts attention to the micropolitical dimension through which norms, knowledge, and identities link up with ideals of political community and democratic governance; coalescing into particular engagements with alterity that variably enable distinctions between “politically qualified life” and “bare life.”⁶

As environmental concerns occupy ever-more prominent positions on political agendas—intersecting with traditionally anthropocentric discourses of security, jobs, development, and migration—it becomes increasingly necessary to consider how “nature” figures into the construction of this ethos. Therefore, rather than taking any a priori position in support of or opposition to attempts to green sovereignty, I argue in favor of an approach that examines the discourses through which efforts to green sovereignty proceed; asking, (1) through what discursive pathways do nature, political community, and governance intersect to constitute exclusionary ethoses of sovereignty? and, (2) how might alternative articulations challenge such exclusions?

My analysis proceeds in two parts. First, I outline theoretical debates over ecosovereignty by focusing on two prominent exemplars: Robyn Eckersley’s *The Green State*⁷ and Mick Smith’s *Against Ecological Sovereignty*.⁸ I use this dialogue as an entrance point to consider the promises and perils of greening sovereignty, and I advance an alternative that proceeds through a less generalizable, but perhaps more strategic, mode of analysis aiming to consider the contingent articulations through which particular manifestations of ecosovereignty acquire their inclusive or exclusive ethos. Second, to gain insight into how such an approach might be employed in practice, I turn to the contemporary American “environmental restrictionist” movement. American environmentalist debates over the so-called immigration problem provide an ideal lens for analyzing the discursive process through which particular iterations of ecosovereignty emerge, as the individuals and groups involved struggle to reconfigure the contours of sovereignty but do so in vastly different manners.⁹ On one hand, environmental restrictionists provide insight into a broader trend—visible across numerous scales, issue areas, and actors—where apparently progressive commitments to nature are being woven into an ethos of sovereignty that is exclusionary. On the other hand, opponents of restrictionism highlight how nature is figuring into potentially inclusive strategies of resistance.

My overarching contention, however, is that progressive responses to this exclusionary environmentalism are immobilized by a failure to fully consider the contingent articulations of green sovereignty’s constitutive elements. Restrictionist arguments have been so divisive precisely because they tap into configurations of nature, political community, and governance that are internalized in green identities and remain unchallenged by opponents. Such shortcomings are reflective of broader theoretical lacunae that could be ameliorated by attending to the relations between these constitutive elements and the changing ethos of sovereignty.

Contested Ecosovereignties

Difficulties reconciling the nonhuman realm with traditional notions of sovereignty are evident in early environmentalist and scholarly approaches to the matter. While international relation debates were centered upon reified conceptions of the self-interested, sovereign nation-state operating in an anarchic sphere that privileged power–politics and relegated environmental concerns to irrevocable fringe status, environmentalist debates merely restated the self-evident disconnect between natural flows and socially constructed boundaries.¹⁰ The shared assumption marking these divergent narratives is that nature is, for the nation-state, an intrinsically instrumental resource linked to the inviolable strictures of territorial sovereignty and, therefore, inevitably at odds with ecologically responsible governance.

However, recent theoretical and empirical shifts have motivated scholars to turn away from these sweeping conclusions and toward contextually grounded accounts that consider the relational, constructed, and contingent nature of sovereignty.¹¹ The academic narrative that has emerged asserts that territoriality has been unbundled¹² and space reconfigured¹³ as authority, control, and legitimacy have been dispersed across scales, and recast within diverse assemblages of governmental units, nongovernmental organizations, transnational corporations, and international institutions. With regard to environmental governance, these empirical shifts have provoked suggestion that, under a period of neoliberal hegemony, sovereign power has been partially decentered from the state and reconsolidated within an ecologically and socially destructive “empire”¹⁴ that necessitates a counterhegemonic environmentalist response.¹⁵

But what should this response look like? Many have expressed hope that the transboundary realities of nature would work in the service of inclusive, cosmopolitan projects,¹⁶ but reactions to neoliberalism are also harnessing ecological discourses where nature is irrevocably bound up in exclusionary social politics that differentially value various populations in efforts to reinforce some vision of a “naturally” sovereign nation-state.¹⁷ In this sense, debates over greening sovereignty are marked, on one hand, by the perceived need to control the deterritorializing forces of neoliberalism, and, on the other hand, by the specters of exclusion that haunt territorialized environmental politics. Thus, green sovereignty functions as a site of contestation between competing projects that seek to project and legitimize authority over some segment of space in the service of molding institutions and subjects better equipped to speak for both nature and society.

In the analysis that follows, my intent is not to provide a holistic review of the literature on sovereignty and nature but rather to examine the ways that two prominent scholarly works: (1) conceptualize nature, political community, and governance; (2) relate these constructions to the concept of “green sovereignty”; and (3) evaluate its inclusive or exclusive potential. I argue that these examples are reflective of broader tendencies among both scholars and practitioners to leave the contingent articulations between these constitutive elements underexplored; a phenomenon that has left environmentalists harkening back to molar forms—where “we” are faced with a choice of either greening the nation-state or rejecting sovereignty in favor of the deterritorializing impulses of nature.

The Pros and Cons of Ecosovereignty

Eckersley’s *The Green State*¹⁸ and Smith’s *Against Ecological Sovereignty*¹⁹ are, in my opinion, the most sophisticated articulations of the opposing positions that divide critical perspectives on sovereignty and nature. For Eckersley, repositioning sovereignty within a green state poses the most promising attempt to confront an ecologically destructive neoliberalism that privileges corporate and elite interests over the public writ large. For Smith, the institution of sovereignty—whatever the articulation of its various elements—is itself structured around a capacity to exist over and above these constitutive contingencies through declaration of a “state of exception.”²⁰ This depoliticizing power renders any environmental gains under a green nation-state subject to arbitrary decisions that

reinstantiate orthodox treatments of nature as a “standing reserve” put to use in service of geopolitics and neoliberal political economics.²¹

Green States and Inclusive Sovereigns

Eckersley begins by recognizing that, historically, the sovereign, liberal democratic nation-state has not exactly been a force for environmental progress.²² However, giving up on the state is, for Eckersley, both practically and theoretically deficient. Realistically, the state is not going anywhere despite challenges from the increasing power of transnational corporations, international financial institutions, and nonstate actors.²³ Instead, such shifts have engendered a crisis of legitimacy that necessitates the reconsolidation of democratic power within an entity strong enough to project its regulatory and punitive authority vis-à-vis private interests in the name of the nation:

The state is enlisted because it is the social institution with the greatest capacity to discipline investors, producers, and consumers. . . . [It] has the capacity to redistribute resources and otherwise influence life opportunities to ensure that the move toward a more sustainable society is not a socially regressive one.²⁴

Reliance on the coercive capacity of “the state” is not simply an instrumental necessity, but an ethical one; it is legitimate because it acquires authority from democratic procedures agreed upon by “the people” and institutionalized in law. Thus, at a theoretical level, the state is not a timeless, autonomous form but is intimately bound up in discursive struggles emanating from the realm of “society.”²⁵ Reconfiguring the socially constructed contours of public responsibility and obligation allows the state’s regulatory and steering mechanisms to work toward alternative political projects pushed forward by an amended demos.

In order to guide the trajectory of such shifts toward an inclusive sovereignty, Eckersley proposes a political community founded upon a blend of communitarian concerns with cultural solidarity and cosmopolitan emphasis on transnational affect. Her “transnational state” would gain legitimacy through its organization around principles of “cosmopolitan nationalism” that strategically reorient the insular ethos of traditional nationalism outward to extend to nonhumans, nonmembers, and future generations.²⁶ In this sense, “the people would remain sovereign, but would be a more variable and fluid community made up of nations and all those who happen to belong, or are likely to belong, to the relevant community at risk.”²⁷

Eckersley attempts to institutionalize this inclusive ethos through a mutually reinforcing interaction between formal green constitutions and deliberative green public spheres. The former would solidify certain social and ecological norms in law (e.g., the precautionary principle, rights to environmental information, public participation, access to justice),²⁸ while the latter would guarantee that a fluctuating array of actors could voice their social and ecological realities in debates having direct implications on their lives.

Green Biopolitics and Ecological Exceptions

Smith, however, is insistent that Eckersley has overestimated the malleability of sovereignty.²⁹ In contrast, Smith draws on Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben in asserting that contemporary life is increasingly characterized by an ever-present state of exception, where the nation-state responds to some “crisis” or “emergency” by suspending the normal political order in the name of saving that very order. In an issue area punctured by calls of crisis that are widely purported to warrant extraordinary and indefinite measures (e.g., climate change, resource shortages, population explosions), there is a real danger that by couching hopes for ecological emancipation within a sovereign order, any potentially radical ecological dialogue will be suspended under the auspices of the

immediate action that a nature in crisis necessitates. While most greens have moved away from prior flirtations with ecoauthoritarianism, the ability of the sovereign to declare a state of exception increases the likelihood that technocratic, top-down, militaristic “solutions” will be the norm.³⁰

Smith contends that under the order of the ecosovereign, both nature and society will be reduced to bare life; deemed no longer deserving of democratic rights and protections but still subject to the coercive force of ecoauthoritarian projects.³¹ As a state of exception is declared, human and nonhuman lives remain subject to governance at a deep, biological level without any concomitant capacity for acting politically. The overarching point is that “[w]hile we can recognize historically different discourses surrounding and informing the normal practices of state sovereignty . . . its ordering principle is precisely not one that is protean. . . . In the last instance sovereign power is wielded by a ‘body’ which ‘decides on the exception.’”³²

This “body” is the nation-state, and “the decision” is—given the track record of the nation-state—likely to invoke ecological emergency as a cover over motives that are definitely anthropocentric.³³ In this sense, calls to green sovereignty, no matter how well intentioned, are likely to end in exceptional decisions that eschew radical ecological solutions in defense of the stability wrought by a capital-friendly logic of ecological modernization.³³ Indeed, “the possibility of this ultimately arbitrary decisionistic assumption of absolute territorial power underlies all claims to state sovereignty, no matter what kind of political constitutions such states espouse.”³⁴ As such, the only way out is through the deterritorializing impulses of radical ecology:

[R]adical ecology tries to save politics and ethics (and not only the natural world), to recognize their “relative autonomy” and their vital importance in constituting a good life for human communities within, and not constitutionally positioned as a sovereign power above, a “more than human” world.³⁵

It is through an ethicopolitical commitment to nature that the geopolitical and capitalistic instrumentalities that breed bare life give way to the freedom of a life unmarked by sovereign power: “[t]o save the whales is to free them from all claims of human sovereignty, to release them into the flows of evolutionary time, of natural history.”³⁶

The Contingent Contours of Green Sovereignty

The two aforementioned approaches are directly conflicting; Eckersley’s immanent critique urges us to consider the potentially progressive lines of flight that might be latent in current institutional forms, while Smith’s response calls attention to the underlying biopolitical structure of sovereignty that is said to negate any potentially radical shifts in environmental governance. The latter contention suggests that while Eckersley’s normative vision highlights the formal institutional shifts whereby multiple voices could speak for nature, her approach leaves undertheorized the interstices in which environmental politics, subtle biopolitical practices, and the often violent spectacles of sovereign power meet.

In particular, “progressive” environmental projects routinely rely on managing the life forces of various populations; concerns over population reduction, for instance, seek to channel fertility rates, distribute movement, and control the productive and consumptive capacities of select populations in efforts to construct a particular type of environmental society. Such projects are often bound up in exclusionary politics of race, class, and gender, and in periods of “crisis” are likely to be imposed rather than subject to democratic debate. The shift that Eckersley envisions, geared to Habermasian ideals of public deliberation,³⁷ would permit a broader scope of inclusion but would not necessarily challenge the discursive pathways through which exclusion advances. The emphasis on consensus, beholden to a pluralistic notion of free and rational deliberation, overlooks the very forms of knowledge/power through which terms of dominant discourses are naturalized—to the detriment of

marginalized populations whose formal inclusion in a dialogic process is not, therefore, likely to produce an equitable role in decision making.

Specifically, with Eckersley's insistence on the necessity of national solidarity as a precondition for ecological democracy,³⁸ there is a real risk that the public nature that emerges from these deliberative spaces may be woven into insidious schemes to reconsolidate imagined communities through the exclusion of Others. Historically, certain constitutive elements of nature have materialized within narratives of exception: discourses of Linnaean classification, Romantic wilderness, Malthusian political economy, and Darwinian natural science have all served as markers of difference enabling the erasure of indigeneous and marginalized inhabitants from the national landscape or constructing them as biopolitical threats to the vitality of the nation.³⁹ These natural concepts, which have worked to efface the violence through which hegemonic national forms have proceeded, are likely to reemerge today under a subtle commitment to progressive environmental politics, rather than an overt commitment to nationalism. Thus, the ethos of sovereignty that would emerge from this green state is potentially an exclusionary one.

While Eckersley might overlook the way that nature is bound up in these micropolitical struggles, Smith's account "cuts the head off the king" only to fashion his ghost into a biopolitical God whose exceptional decisions are a *fait accompli*. Both the declaration of the state of exception and the trajectory through which it emerges appear inevitable.

These universalizing assumptions stem from the fact that Smith does not unpack the contingent articulations that suture nation, state, and nature together at a particular point in time and leave him open to the same critique that Connolly levels against Agamben:

He does not ask whether disturbing developments in the logic of sovereignty are bound not merely to a conjunction between biopolitics and sovereignty, *but to a conjunction between them and renewed attempts to consolidate . . . the nation during a time when it is even more difficult to do so. . . .* The shape of the ethos infusing the practice of sovereignty is therefore critical and not a mere conjugation of sovereignty and biopolitics.⁴⁰

As Eckersley recognizes, a particular conception of nationality legitimates certain forms of state activity: its use of internal and external coercion, intervention into the economy domestically and internationally, policing of the border, and regulation of nature. Accompanying these actions, I would add—and dependent, in part, upon the particular nation-state configurations being advanced—are myriad forms of discipline (institutionalized through environmental and social pedagogy, representations of Others in popular culture, modes of identity privileged within state institutions, and so on) and their biopolitical counterparts (hedged within demography, census categories, measures of political economic strength, fertility, environmental health, and so on).

On one hand, for example, ecological nativists advance configurations of sovereignty that deploy scientific concepts (like *cultural carrying capacity*) to construct "the nation" as a natural entity that links up smoothly with racialized projects where the state only attains legitimacy insofar as it weeds out "sources of pollution" (that is, non-white populations). On the other hand, environmental justice advocates frequently push for cosmopolitan or subaltern modes of identity that tweak hegemonic national forms in more inclusive directions, while attempting to enlarge the elements of the state that would provide environmental and workplace regulations, social safety nets, and opportunities for local-level participation in environmental decision making. This latter ethos contests the discursive pathways through which a state of exception might be declared, and the ways that this declaration would impact already marginalized populations—human and nonhuman.

Therefore, the logics that guide the application of sovereign power do not emerge within an autonomous site irrevocably wedded to predetermined interests but through a variety of social forces. As Connolly notes, "within the idea of the exception 'decided' by sovereignty, an oscillation

flows between a juridically established authority that authoritatively decides the exception and social powers that assert themselves irresistibly in and around the decision.”⁴¹ Similarly, Roxanne Doty argues in her analysis of American vigilante justice groups that “the decision that ushers in both the enemy and ‘we,’ ‘the people,’ ‘the nation,’ ‘the society,’ is in fact a plurality of decisions made from diverse locales.”⁴² Discursive struggles over the scope of political community, and the scale and social purpose of governance (as well as over the racial, gendered, class-based, and sexualized norms that are embedded within these discussions) create the conditions of existence for any formal declaration of exception. Nature plays an increasingly central role within this process.

Smith harkens back to an image of a singular sovereign body—the nation-state—declaring a state of exception, when such a declaration emerges from a multiplicity of enunciative sites dispersed throughout society. Environmental politics, in particular, is an issue area in which there exists no definitive voice that renders nature intelligible for all. And as environmental advocates strategically latch onto traditionally anthropocentric discourses of security, jobs, and development, the particular ethos that green sovereignty might take on depends upon hotly contested struggles—between the scientist, deep ecologist, bureaucrat, economist, social justice advocate, and, at times, xenophobe—to articulate a particular conception of nature and its relation to ideals of political community and governance. The outcomes of these struggles are not predetermined.

As a consequence, Smith’s conclusion—that ecosovereignty will reduce both humanity and nature to bare life⁴³—is too sweeping. Rather than opposing a universalizing logic of sovereignty that meshes smoothly with Lockean conceptions of nature as wasteland, to an equally universalizing radical ecological sphere that links up perfectly with a nonstate outside,⁴⁴ it makes more sense to consider how various nonhuman flows are bounded within complex, cross-cutting, and often contradictory social registers.

To illuminate this process, I now turn to American debates over the environmental impacts of immigration. I contend that environmental restrictionists provide insight into the ways that the apparently progressive project of greening the state is working to construct an exclusionary ethos of ecosovereignty. I then look to opponents for potential strategies of resistance.

From Spaces of Flows to Spaces of Exception

In June 2008, advertisements from a coalition calling itself *America’s Leadership Team for Long-Range Population-Immigration-Resource Planning* began surfacing in numerous, predominantly leftist, news sources, proclaiming that immigration poses the greatest threat to the U.S.’ natural environment today. One such ad appeared in the *New York Times*:

As America’s population races from the current 300 million to a projected 400 million in the next 30 years, progressive thinkers are confronted with a debate among themselves—and Others—as to our nation’s capacity to absorb domestic population growth and growth due almost entirely to immigration. What price will we pay in terms of the environment? What will be the impact on resources from water to energy? What additional challenges will be created by this growth? What is our responsibility to future generations?⁴⁵

Framed against a backdrop of an apparently pristine landscape, the ad portrays a man standing in front of two paths: one presumably leads to a sustainable future, while the other to certain ecological destruction. Throughout other coalitional publications that comprise this ad blitz—six pieces appearing in fifteen news sources (the *American Prospect*, the *Atlantic*, *Forbes*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Harpers*, *the Hill*, the *LA Times*, *Mother Jones*, *The Nation*, *Nature*, *Newsweek*, the *New Republic*, the *NY Times*, *Roll Call*, and the *Washington Post*)—a similar narrative has emerged: US’ citizens have taken significant steps toward the adoption of a progressive environmental culture (having fewer children, recycling, and developing renewable energy sources), however, we continue to

import population growth. This offsets “our” (allegedly) diminishing consumptive habits and puts serious stress on ecosystems that are already at or above their carrying capacities. Throughout the advertisements, this overarching neo-Malthusian logic is interspersed with discursive forays into postmaterialist values, place-based identities, romantic aesthetics, geopolitics, and cultural consumptive patterns.

The coalition has proceeded by strategically directing its arguments at leftist, environmentalist audiences, while, at the same time, recognizing that its position is controversial in such circles, and attempting to anticipate unease with its exclusionary policy prescriptions:

We want it all. We want a clean environment, adequate natural resources, good housing, plenty of food, first rate healthcare, and so on. We also feel the need to welcome the world to our front door, or, in many cases, our back door. But America is rapidly approaching the point of no return. Either we opt for preserving the quality of life that has attracted so many millions in the past by limiting some in the future. Or we continue to accept millions, knowing that our children and grandchildren will continue to pay a huge price. Nobody wants to close the doors. Nobody wants to totally abandon our heritage of immigration and the rich tapestry it has woven. But with more sensible numbers we could actually restore it. More and more progressive thinkers are saying it's time to connect the dots . . .

While this addendum speaks to progressive concerns over natural resources, intergenerational justice, and even multiculturalism, the ease with which the nonhuman realm is rhetorically transformed into a national possession is telling; the preservation of our shared national heritage is explicitly linked with the fate of our environment. A commentator in a popular restrictionist journal frames the issue in even starker terms: “Mexico is sweeping its people and problems into the United States . . . [i]f we don't solve these problems ourselves, then Mother Nature will solve them for us.”⁴⁶

Though the coalition is more strategic in its presentation, the narrative that emerges is quite similar: the visual appeal to the “road less traveled” works to conjure up emotions of radical independence and populism (ideals that lay at the heart of both American and environmentalist identities), while the text serves to fill the two distinct paths with metaphoric and symbolic meanings. One road, polluted and crowded with, presumably Mexican, immigrants, leads from “our back door” to certain ecological destruction. The other, pristine and inhabited by a treasured line of “Americans” (past, present, and future), proceeds along a sacred path to the preservation of our wilderness, natural resources, and, by extension, “rich” multicultural heritage. Ecological health, in other words, functions as the foundation upon which this national imaginary is sustained; the fate of nature is the fate of the nation.

The current campaign is another iteration of an environmental restrictionist argument that has periodically surfaced in American politics over the past forty years. The environmental restrictionist movement has enjoyed some influence in bringing the issue onto the American policy agenda: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 specified that subsequent immigration reports prepared for Congress should consider the impact of immigration on American environmental quality,⁴⁷ and President Clinton's Council on Sustainable Development concluded that “reducing immigration levels is a necessary part of population stabilization and the drive toward sustainability.”⁴⁸

Although major environmental organizations in the United States remain “neutral” on the issue of immigration, internal debates have been incredibly divisive,⁴⁹ and numerous well-known environmental advocates (including Garrett Hardin, Edward Abbey, Paul Ehrlich, Gaylord Nelson, Herman Daly, David Brower, George Sessions, William Rees, “Captain” Paul Watson, and Lester Brown) have voiced support for the restrictionist cause. Struggles within the Sierra Club, in particular, have brought the issue into the national spotlight, and although the organization has been mostly successful in fending off restrictionist efforts, there remains significant sympathy for immigration reduction proposals among the membership.⁵⁰

However, it is not only environmental advocates who are deploying this logic. The coalition responsible for the aforementioned advertising campaign consists of five groups with widely varying levels of environmental concern. For example, the members of Californians for Population Stabilization exhibit a significant history of environmental activism and devote considerable attention to environmental concerns, while the American Immigration Control Foundation is a hypernationalist front that evinces no concern for the environment and has ties with white supremacist and xenophobic organizations.⁵¹ There are numerous other groups operating at the national, state, and local levels that argue against immigration on environmental grounds but that diverge markedly in their politics.⁵²

What differentiates this campaign from past iterations of restrictionism is not only this heterogeneity, but the emergence of a rhetorical strategy that is far more polished and nuanced than the blatant nativism or coarse neo-Malthusianism that characterized past restrictionist efforts.⁵³ Contemporary efforts to reconfigure the ethos of sovereignty in an ecological direction take place amid the echoes of socially negligent environmentalism—environmentalist connections with eugenicism, “blood and soil” nativism, and authoritarianism—and today’s restrictionist movement is hypersensitive to these historical relations. The recent campaign has learned from past failures and begun to push forward a seemingly benign discourse of ecocommunitarianism that attempts to tap into the roots of American environmental imaginaries.⁵⁴

This discursive shift, coupled with the appearance of apparently leftist restrictionist groups (such as Progressives for Immigration Reform and the Alliance for a Sustainable America) and the recent organization of a First National Conference on Immigration, Conservation and the Environment,⁵⁵ suggests that restrictionists have begun to couch their exclusionary arguments within the progressive project of greening sovereignty.

Toward a Green State: The Ecocommunitarian Challenge

While the central pillar of ecocommunitarianism remains a familiar neo-Malthusian logic, this emergent discourse couches concerns over population growth in a forceful critique of neoliberal economic policies and forges an alternative vision of an explicitly multicultural America comprised of progressive environmentalists. Distancing himself from a nativist logic, ecological economist Herman Daly, a board member of the Carrying Capacity Network, remarks “[I]t is a terrible thing to be ‘anti-immigrant’ . . . Immigration, however, is a policy, not a person, and one can be . . . ‘pro-immigration limits’ without in the least being anti-immigrant.”⁵⁶ Similarly, in an article entitled “‘No’ to Immigrant Bashing,” Roy Beck of *NumbersUSA* observes:

The task before the nation in setting a fair level of immigration is not about race or some vision of a homogeneous white America; it is about protecting and enhancing the United States’ unique experiment in democracy for all Americans, including recent immigrants, regardless of their particular ethnicity.⁵⁷

In an effort to provide for continuation of this multicultural “democratic experiment,” the ecocommunitarian discourse weds standard neo-Malthusian population anxieties to a national cultural consumptive imaginary. For example, a widely cited Carrying Capacity Network study suggests that immigrant levels of consumption rise dramatically in coming to the United States:

We need to recognize the simple fact that the last thing this world needs is more Americans. The world just cannot afford what Americans do to the earth, air, and water. And it does not matter whether these Americans are Americans by birth or by border crossing. It does not matter what color their skin is. It does not matter what language they speak or which god they worship. What matters is that they will live like Americans.⁵⁸

In other words, Americans—writ large—are consumers, and more Americans means more consumption. This statement both distances itself from the unreflexive nationalism of nativist groupings, and taps into the collective consciousness of environmentalists through an appeal to transform America into a responsible global environmental steward by limiting our consumptive practices.

However, an acknowledgment of the global scope of environmental problems begs the question: if nature is a global concern, why focus on national solutions? The answer, for ecocommunitarians, centers upon the alleged complicity between global arrangements and the interests of capital. Ecocommunitarians stress that lax immigration policies are in the interests of transnational elites; lobbied for by neoclassical economists, multinational corporations, and neoliberal interest groups, because they produce a flexible, mobile labor force with no sense of “place”—“a deep attachment to specific geographies fashioned by repeated interactions that provide both the context and content for the construction of personal and cultural identity.”⁵⁹ Place is, thus, an environmental and social necessity that is being undone by the deterritorializing impulses of neoliberalism.⁶⁰

Through this narrative, neoliberal hegemony is linked with a “global space,” in opposition to progressive environmentalism, which is the product of a “national place.”⁶¹ By opening up the nation-state to a variety of economic flows, neoliberalism is argued to diminish the capacity of the state to deal with social and environmental problems that the nation deems legitimate sources of concern; a phenomenon only amplified by heightened immigration. For instance, environmental ethicist and President of Progressives for Immigration Reform, Philip Cafaro, wonders how citizens could be convinced to make environmental sacrifices if national projects to, say, decrease carbon dioxide output, were countered by population growth from immigration:

If we want to convince our more skeptical fellow-citizens to follow our lead and consume less, we need to get population growth under control . . . [Saying] ‘you need to consume less, make these efforts and sacrifices, so that our country can accommodate tens of millions more Mexicans, tens of millions more Chinese . . . and all their descendants’ . . . Even a reasonable and conscientious citizen might well ask why he or she should bother.⁶²

This appeal to political community is not one of blatant hypernationalism, but a communitarian concern for self-determination wedded to the purported exigencies of a global ecological emergency. Undergirding the narrative is a sharp division between “the economic”—associated with instrumental reasoning, narrow self-interest, private benefit, and the global scale—and “the environmental”—associated with intrinsic value, broad conceptions of interest, public benefit, and the national scale. The logical conclusion that flows from this dichotomy is that we have a moral obligation to our nature and our future that trumps any responsibility to a populace that enjoys political rights elsewhere. As Cafaro and Staples argue, “[w]ith open borders, the interests of nonhuman nature would be sacrificed completely to the interests of people . . . The economic interests of would-be immigrants would trump the very existence of many nonhuman organisms, endangered species, and wild places in the United States.”⁶³

Overall, an ethical concern for the Other is displaced through a communitarian vision of ecological democracy where obligation to humans and nonhumans alike is a function of inclusion within a bounded territorial and cultural community. In contrast with nativists, the “enemy” tying this communal narrative together is not immigrants or any foreign entity, but those amorphous forces of neoliberalism whose incessant flows debilitate the types of ecological sacrifices that could be fashioned by a sovereign ecological state. In an attempt to secure these bounds, the national place of environmentalists is juxtaposed against a homogenous space of difference—the global space—in which transnational capitalists, immigrants, and cosmopolitan idealists all reside. In other words, immigrants are not the problem, global neoliberalism is; the attempt to reduce immigrants to bare life emerges indirectly through a form of guilt by association.

Nonetheless, despite their seemingly benign rhetoric, ecocommunitarians have embraced draconian policies: supporting racialized antiimmigrant laws at the substate level,⁶⁴ forcefully rejecting attempts to provide a path to citizenship for immigrants who were brought to the United States as children,⁶⁵ seeking to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment's birthright citizenship clause, and calling for a total moratorium on immigration into the United States.⁶⁶ Not only are immigrants incapable of speaking or acting on behalf of nature here, they are stripped of any potential for becoming national subjects, while their day-to-day lives are simultaneously exposed to the ever-present possibility of coercive force.

Responding to Restrictionism

The emergence of ecocommunitarianism as the dominant discourse of restrictionism suggests that the "exception" emerges not through a predetermined, "anthropocentric" logic, but through contingent articulations between nature, political community, and governance. While bare life might be an ever-present potentiality, restrictionists attempt to actualize this state by constructing a series of relational equivalences through which immigrant populations are deemed "threatening" under a communitarian ethos of ecosovereignty—one that meshes in important ways with the leftist project of greening the state. This begs the question: given the reliance of restrictionists on this seemingly progressive discourse, how might opponents effectively combat this logic through alternative articulations of nature, political community, and governance? And might certain articulations cultivate a more generous ethos of sovereignty where already marginalized populations are less likely to be deemed bare life amid ecological crises?

Restrictionism has met skepticism from academics and activists alike, who have found racial, gendered, class-based, and neocolonial undertones in the logics being advanced.⁶⁷ Critics have asserted that the territorialized nature advanced by restrictionists is inadequate in considering the difficult ethical questions stemming from historical injustices and spatial interconnections. Specifically, they argue that the nation-state may not be the appropriate locus of ethical responsibility in a period where sovereign authority, control, and legitimacy intermingle among a variety of actors across a spectrum of scales. For example, both environmental degradation and immigration in the US-Mexico border region are produced through a sovereign assemblage cobbled together through the North American Free Trade Agreement, International Monetary Fund and World Bank conditionalities, the Colorado River Compact, a weak Mexican state, and a whole host of American laws and norms. Opponents of restrictionism argue that adjudicating questions of responsibility and obligation by turning to black-boxed nation-states or "national cultures" elides both the transnational character of these structures, and the profound asymmetries of power that they produce. As a consequence, restrictionists fail to grapple with the root causes of social and environmental destruction.

Despite their invaluable critiques, however, opponents tend to portray environmental restrictionism as homogeneous, and indicative of an emerging trend whereby conservatives "appropriate" nature in their attempts to refashion sovereignty along hypernationalist, racist lines.⁶⁸ At their most nuanced, such appraisals characterize restrictionists in two categories: nativists and neo-Malthusians.⁶⁹ Whatever their differences, both logics are argued to err in failing to recognize that environmentalism is a global struggle that demands cosmopolitan modes of thinking.⁷⁰ Restrictionist groups are, thus, said to be "greenwashing" nativism⁷¹; they are not "real" environmentalists, but "wolves in sheep's clothing."⁷²

Similar to Smith, responses have by and large rejected ecosovereignty as an exclusionary project that instrumentally uses a narrative of natural crisis in order to advance anthropocentric social goals. As an alternative, they have gestured toward the emancipatory, deterritorialized sphere of radical ecology. Though the counternarratives to restrictionism vary, the relationship between political community, governance, and nature is consistently argued to be straightforward: "immigrants live closer to nature"⁷³; or "nature thrives on diversity"⁷⁴; or "nature heeds no borders."⁷⁵ The

sovereignty of nature, in other words, provides lessons that social life can be modeled on; the call of the Wild and the chants of social justice converge.⁷⁶

While I sympathize with such responses, an unintended consequence is that the ecocommunitarian narrative, which has the most potential to influence progressives, has been widely neglected (the relative nuances of ecocommunitarianism do not need to be identified and grappled with if all restrictionists are racist xenophobes who are merely appropriating nature). This is worrisome because the ecocommunitarian logic taps into certain ontological foundations of contemporary American environmentalism—a rhetorical commitment to a multicultural nation, concern with consumption, attachment to place, emphasis on global stewardship and intergenerational justice, critique of neoliberalism, and so on—and, thus, needs to be forcefully addressed (an occurrence that is unlikely, given the current strategic trajectory of critical responses). In certain logical respects, the ecocommunitarian defense of environmental nationalism is similar to Eckersley's; the solidarity inscribed within the nation provides a sense of public concern without which asking for environmental sacrifices would be impossible.⁷⁷

Despite this rhetorical rejection of green sovereignty, the grounded practices of environmental justice and immigrants' rights organizations often point toward alternative articulations of nature, political community, and governance that are incredibly innovative. For instance, the social and environmental justice organization, the Center for New Community, has launched the most in-depth critique and analysis of the environmental restrictionist movement to date through its campaign on "Race, Migration and the Environment" and its *Imagine2050* blog. And while similarly critiquing restrictionists for their "appropriation of nature," the nature being constructed by the CNC is itself bound up in an effort to reconfigure American sovereignty:

By the year 2050, one out of five Americans will be foreign born. Latino and Asian communities will increase significantly. There will be no clear racial or ethnic majority. We will become a nation of minorities. Today's perceptions of foreignness will challenge how Americans identify themselves over the coming decades. In light of these challenges, *Imagine 2050* believes igniting candid conversations around race, immigration, and environment will become increasingly necessary to American democracy.⁷⁸

Within this project, the collective idea of "America" is not rejected but is retooled by a critical ethos that seeks to nurture respect for difference. Yet, this is not the only communal imaginary being conjured; subaltern, local, transnational, and cosmopolitan forms of identity⁷⁹ are also embraced at particular moments to strategically push and pull the contours of nationhood away from the hyper-nationalist terrain on which it is so often lodged.

Similarly, for the CNC and its allies, the state is not rejected but is targeted so that it might work with a renewed sense of legitimacy. In those venues that provide strategic leverage, the organization urges federal and state governments to regulate and redistribute to construct a more transparent and participatory democracy.⁸⁰ The state, however, is not a sacred site but a strategic one, and where appealing to this juridical form risk reinforcing an exclusionary ethos, critique replaces engagement and alternative arrangements of governance are advanced. Attempts to work "within" the state are, thus, supplemented by a variety of actions "outside"; including a "Biking Beyond Bigotry" tour, a newsletter that satirizes restrictionist claims, and the organization of protests against entities funding restrictionist organizations.

Through this strategy, an alternative nature emerges; one that is carefully coded across these variable social registers to protect and enhance the lives of marginalized populations—human and nonhuman—by way of localized interventions that seek to detach nature from its exclusionary social bases and reattach it to forms of community and governance that might work toward an inclusive ethos of ecosovereignty. In a report entitled, "Race, Migration and the Environment," the CNC opens by stating "[i]n order to tackle the serious crises at hand, environmental movements need

to reject the historically dangerous understanding that nature is something separate from society, and examine the ways they are interconnected.” The report proceeds by examining how migrant populations encounter the nonhuman realm and argues that the American environmental movement would benefit from the inclusion of these unique socio-natural perspectives.⁸¹

Overall, a commitment to nature is entwined in a commitment to this inclusive, outward-oriented ethos of ecosovereignty. The radically democratic impetus of such a strategy works to decenter claims of legitimacy away from the traditional state authorities and hypernationalist sympathizers who might work to invoke an exception, while rechanneling the discursive pathways through which commitments to nature might be complicit in reducing marginalized populations to bare life.

The challenge for opponents of restrictionism is to move beyond narratives that equate restrictionism with exclusionary nativism, and “real” commitments to nature with inclusion and social justice. A more promising approach is to explore how conceptions of nature link with exclusionary iterations of sovereignty and show how alternative practices might challenge these forms. Such a move could destabilize previous positions of certainty, but the strategic rewards are infinitely grander, promoting a reflexive environmentalism that opens the door to new green alliances by elevating the problem of “nature’s intelligibility”⁸² to a place of central concern in dialogues over greening sovereignty.

Conclusion

Failure to interrogate the linkages between the constitutive elements of green sovereignty—specifically, nature, political community, and governance—results in anemic responses that, in this case, are excessively reliant on counternarratives that do little to address restrictionism’s most sophisticated iterations, and consequently foreclose the type of self-critical thinking that would disable further expansion of the movement into leftist circles. Rather than embracing a green state or rejecting the greening of sovereignty out of hand, like Eckersley and Smith, respectively, a better understanding of the constitutive articulations through which radical (and exclusionary) ecopolitics might proceed—an attention to the ethos of ecosovereignty—offers environmentalists a broader array of strategies in negotiating more just, radically democratic futures. The insights of this analytical approach can be applied to broader environmental debates where efforts to speak for nature are closely linked with alternative social projects, shedding light on the promises and perils of environmental nationalism; delineating the contexts within which the securitization of nature might lead to a militarized state of exception; and mapping out the discourses within which debates over ethical obligations to a variety of human and nonhuman Others (e.g., climate refugees and environmental migrants) are likely to take place.

In contrast with those who insist on the necessity of greening sovereignty, the example of environmental restrictionism is a cautionary tale that biopolitical norms that are commonsensical within environmentalist imaginaries can easily be translated into violent exclusions during periods of “crisis.” In contrast with those who reject all efforts to rearticulate sovereignty in a more ecologically (and socially) benign direction, the strategic difficulties faced by greens in dealing with restrictionism might remind us that the supposed sovereignty of nature is always already punctured by social relations that must be taken into account to forge more inclusive forms of socioecological governance.

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Notes

1. For reviews of green engagements with sovereignty, see Ken Conca, "Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty Debate," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): 701–11; Daniel Deudney, "Global Village Sovereignty: Intergenerational Sovereign Publics, Federal-Republican Earth Constitutions, and Planetary Identities," in *The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics*, ed. Karen Litfin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 299–325; Robyn Eckersley, *The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004).
2. Robyn Eckersley, *The Green State*; Eckersley, "The State as Gatekeeper: A Reply," *Politics and Ethics Review* 2, no. 2 (2006): 127–38; Eckersley, "From Cosmopolitan Nationalism to Cosmopolitan Democracy," *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 675–92; Eckersley, "Environmentalism and Patriotism: An Unholy Alliance?" in *Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives*, eds. Igor Primoratz and Aleksandar Pavkovic (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2007); Christian Hunold and John Dryzek, "Green Political Strategy and the State: Combining Political Theory and Comparative History," in *The State and the Global Ecological Crisis*, eds. John Barry and Robyn Eckersley (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 75–96; James Meadowcroft, "From Welfare State to Ecostate," in *The State and the Global Ecological Crisis*, eds. Barry and Eckersley, 3–24.
3. Carol Gould, "Ecological Democracy: Statist or Transnational?" *Politics and Ethics Review* 2, no. 2 (2006): 119–26; Mick Smith, "Suspended Animation: Radical Ecology, Sovereign Powers and Saving the (Natural) World," *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 2, no. 1 (2008): 1–25; Mick Smith, "Against Ecological Sovereignty: Agamben, Politics and Globalisation," *Environmental Politics* 18, no. 1 (2009): 99–116; Mick Smith, *Against Ecological Sovereignty: Ethics, Biopolitics and Saving the Natural World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).
4. Nature refers to the socially constructed ideal that is employed to represent the vast multiplicity of the non-human realm. Nature is constructed through a range of epistemological practices (Malthusian, Darwinian, romantic, liberal economic, etc.). "Political community" refers to the locus of social or cultural life with which one closely identifies and believes ought to guide political decisions. Ideals of political community include liberal nationalism, subaltern nationalism, communitarianism, bioregionalism, and cosmopolitanism. "Governance," here, refers to the institutional form within which authority, control, and legitimacy ought to rest according to the political community of choice. Privileged institutions of governance include the state, the locality, a global confederation, a world government, and so on.
5. William Connolly, "The Complexity of Sovereignty," in *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, eds. Jenny Edkins, Veronique Pin-Fat, and Michael Shapiro (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 23–40.
6. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
7. Eckersley, *The Green State*.
8. Smith, *Against Ecological Sovereignty: Ethics, Biopolitics and Saving the Natural World*.
9. Although I focus on the American example, the environmental restrictionist logic has been advanced by individuals, organizations, and/or political parties in numerous national contexts, including: Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Russia, and Australia. See Jonathan Olsen, *Nature and Nationalism: Right Wing Ecology and the Politics of Identity in Contemporary Germany* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 135–40.

10. Eckersley, Robyn Eckersley, 4.
11. Conca, *Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty Debate*; Thom Kuehls, *Beyond Sovereign Territory: The Space of Ecopolitics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Litfin, *The Greening of Sovereignty*.
12. John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47, no. 1 (1993): 139–74.
13. Litfin, *The Greening of Sovereignty*, 9.
14. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
15. William Chaloupka, "The Irrepressible Lightness and Joy of Being Green: Empire and Environmentalism," *Strategies* 16, no. 2 (2003): 147–61; Simon Dalby, "Ecological Politics, Violence and the Theme of Empire," *Global Environmental Politics* 4, no. 2 (2004): 1–11.
16. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond"; Veronica Ward, "Sovereignty and Ecosystem Management: Clash of Concepts and Boundaries?," in *The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics*, ed. Karen Litfin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 79–108.
17. Bruce Braun, *The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture, and Power on Canada's West Coast* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Jake Kosek, *Understories: The Political Life of Forests in Northern New Mexico* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
18. Eckersley, *The Green State*.
19. Smith, *Against Ecological Sovereignty*.
20. Agamben, *Homo Sacer and State of Exception*.
21. Smith, "Suspended Animation," 3–5; Smith, *Against Ecological Sovereignty*, 108.
22. Eckersley, *The Green State*, 4–5.
23. *Ibid.*, 5.
24. *Ibid.*, 12.
25. *Ibid.*, 34–5, 62–4.
26. *Ibid.*, Chapter 7; "From Cosmopolitan Nationalism to Cosmopolitan Democracy, 677.
27. Eckersley, *The Green State*, 197.
28. *Ibid.*, 193.
29. Smith, *Against Ecological Sovereignty*, 200–1.
30. Smith, "Against Ecological Sovereignty: Agamben, Politics and Globalisation," 110; *Against Ecological Sovereignty*, 204.
31. Smith, "Against Ecological Sovereignty: Agamben, Politics and Globalisation," 112–114.
32. *Ibid.*, 113.
33. *Ibid.*, 112.
34. *Ibid.*, 106.
35. Smith, "Suspended Animation," 9.
36. *Ibid.*, 3.
37. Eckersley, *The Green State*, 113–18.
38. Eckersley, "From Cosmopolitan Nationalism to Cosmopolitan Democracy," 685.
39. Braun, *The Intemperate Rainforest*; Kosek, *Understories*.
40. Connolly, "The Complexity of Sovereignty," 29, *his italics*.
41. *Ibid.*, 30.
42. Roxanne Doty, "States of Exception on the Mexico-US Border: Security, 'Decisions,' and Civilian Border Patrols," *International Political Sociology* 1 (2007): 130.
43. Smith, "Against Ecological Sovereignty: Agamben, Politics and Globalisation," 114.
44. *Ibid.*, 113.
45. America's Leadership Team for Long-Range Population-Immigration-Resource Planning, *NY Times*, September 23, 2008, A21.
46. Robert Duncan, "America: A Frog in the Kettle slowly coming to a boil," *The Social Contract* 18, no. 1 (2007).

47. Ellen Percy Kraly, "US Immigration and the Environment: Scientific Research and Analytic Issues," US Commission on Immigration Reform (1995). Accessed November 13, 2010, <http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/respapers/usi-feb95.pdf>.
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49. Leslie King, "Ideology, Strategy and Conflict in a Social Movement Organization: The Sierra Club Immigration Wars," *Mobilization* 13, no. 1 (2008): 45–61.
50. Ibid.
51. The American Immigration Control Foundation was founded in 1983 by John Vinson, a regular contributor to the white-supremacist Council of Conservative *Citizen's Informer* Newsletter. The Southern Poverty Law Center notes that Vinson "often speaks at CCC meetings, and is a founding member of the white supremacist League of the South." Southern Poverty Law Center, *Intelligence Report* 101 (2001). Accessed November 13, 2010, <http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2001/spring/blood-on-the-border/anti-immigration->
52. National level groups include the Carrying Capacity Network, Negative Population Growth, the Federation for American Immigration Reform, and Progressives for Immigration Reform; state level groups include Colorado Alliance for Immigration Reform, Floridians for a Sustainable Population, and Alternatives to Growth Oregon; and several sizable local chapters of environmentalist organizations have voiced such connections, as have local level groups founded with regard to immigration-related issues.
53. For example, deep ecological hero Edward Abbey once remarked: . . . "it might be wise for us as American citizens to consider calling a halt to the mass influx of even more millions of hungry, ignorant, unskilled, and culturally-morally-genetically impoverished people." From Edward Abbey, *One Life at a Time, Please* (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1988), 43.
54. The coalition's advertising campaign has ended, but several of the individual groups have continued ads employing the ecocommunitarian discourse. In April 2012, Californians for Population Stabilization announced a national TV advertisement, blaming global warming on immigration to the United States, that has aired on "liberal" American network, MSNBC.
55. Held at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, October 5, 2010.
56. Herman Daly, "Population, Migration, and Globalization," *Ecological Economics*, 59, no. 2 (2006): 189.
57. Roy Beck, "*No*" to *Immigrant Bashing* (1996). Accessed November 13, 2010, <http://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/about-us/no-immigrant-bashing/no-immigrant-bashing.html>.
58. Jason Dinalt, "The Environmental Impact of Immigration into the United States," *Carrying Capacity Network's Focus* 4, no. 2 (1997). Accessed October 25, 2010, <http://www.carryingcapacity.org/DinAlt.htm>.
59. Robert Chapman, "Confessions of a Malthusian Restrictionist," *Ecological Economics* 59, no. 2 (2006): 216.
60. Chapman, "Confessions of a Malthusian Restrictionist"; Philip Cafaro and Winthrop Staples III, "The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States," *Environmental Ethics* 31 (2009): 5–30.
61. Chapman, Ibid., 216; Daly, "Population, Migration and Globalization," 187.
62. Philip Cafaro, "Hypocrisy and Responsibility" (2010) in *Progressives for Immigration Reform Blog*, September 28, 2010. Accessed November 13, 2010, <http://www.progressivesforimmigrationreform.org/2010/09/28/hypocrisy-and-responsibility/>.
63. Cafaro and Staples, "The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration," 19.
64. For example, Leah Durant has voiced support for Arizona's SB 1070. See Durant, "Bolton's Ruling a Major Miscarriage of Justice," PFIR, July 28, 2010.
65. A Progressives for Immigration Reform blogger recently expressed his opposition to the 'Dream Act.' See Chris Brown, "The Dream Act: Just Another Amnesty Bill." PFIR, June 29, 2011.
66. The birthright citizenship and moratorium issues have been central to recent restrictionist efforts.
67. David Reimers, *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn against Immigration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Debra Salazar and John Hewitt Jr., "Think Globally, Secure the Borders:

- The Oregon Environmental Movement and the Population/Immigration Debate,” *Organization and Environment* 14, no. 3 (2001): 290–310; Betsy Hartman, “Conserving Racism: The Greening of Hate at Home and Abroad,” *Different Takes* 27 (2004): 1–4; Rajani Bhatia, “Green or Brown? White Nativist Environmental Movements,” in *Home-Grown Hate: Gender and Organized Racism*, ed. Abby Ferber (New York: Routledge, 2004), 194–214; Jessica LeAnn Urban, *Nation, Immigration and Environmental Security* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Roldan Muradian, “Immigration and the Environment: Underlying Values and Scope of Analysis,” *Ecological Economics* 59, no. 2 (2006): 208–13; Leslie King, “Charting a Discursive Field: Environmentalists for US Population Stabilization,” *Sociological Inquiry* 27, no. 3 (2007): 301–25.
68. Eric Ward, “On Earth Day, Environmentalists Must Not Link Arms with Anti-Immigrant Forces,” *The Progressive*, April 21, 2009; Mark Potok, “Executive Summary,” in *Greenwash: Nativists, Environmentalism and the Hypocrisy of Hate*, *Southern Poverty Law Center* (2010), 4–5; Andrew Ross, “Greenwashing Nativism,” *The Nation*, August 16, 2010.
 69. Muradian, “Immigration and the Environment,” 208–210; Bhatia, “Green or Brown? White Nativist Environmental Movements,” 225.
 70. Potok, “Executive Summary.”
 71. Ross, “Greenwashing Nativism.”
 72. Heidi Beirich, “The Hypocrisy of Hate: Nativists and Environmentalism,” in *Greenwash: Nativists, Environmentalism and the Hypocrisy of Hate*.
 73. This sentiment is expressed by a subject interviewed in the CNC’s recent film: *The Green War on Immigrants*. Do Tell Productions (2010).
 74. An audience member made this connection at a recent panel discussion that I participated in. Center for Justice, Peace, and the Environment (October 12, 2009).
 75. See Potok, “Executive Summary,” 73.
 76. Smith does, at times, reject these simplistic assertions of Nature’s sovereignty, though he still feels that a particular iteration of radical ecopolitics escapes sovereign power. See “Suspended Animation,” 13; *Against Ecological Sovereignty*, 95.
 77. This is not to suggest that Eckersley would agree with restrictionism. She actually uses the example of Australian restrictionist organizations in discussing potentially troubling developments in efforts to green nationalism. See “Environmentalism and Patriotism,” 198.
 78. Imagine2050. 2010. “Who we are,” accessed July 5, 2011, <http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/about/>.
 79. A search of CNC’s “Imagine2050” blog highlights a variety of communal forms being advanced, including: national and transnational alliances of youths concerned with environmental justice, coalitions between first nations and migrants, and various instances of local community activism.
 80. See entries by Carlos Rich on the “Imagine2050” blog, highlighting the need for living wages, health, and safety standards, and environmental regulations: “Fear and Loathing on the Killing Room Floor,” June 15, 2011. Accessed July 5, 2011, <http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2011/06/15/fear-and-loathing-on-the-killing-room-floor/>; “Meatpacking Workers Ready for Struggle in 2011, January 5, 2011, accessed July 5, 2011, <http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2011/01/05/meatpacking-workers-ready-for-struggle-in-2011/>.
 81. Minnie McMahon and Jesse Sanes, “Race, Migration, and the Environment,” the Center for New Community (2011).
 82. Braun, *The Intemperate Rainforest*.

Bio

John Hultgren is an Instructor in the Department of Politics & International Affairs at Northern Arizona University.